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A WIDE BERTH FOR FRCP 52: 
APPLICATION OF THE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF REVIEW IN 
THE ADMIRALTY LAW CONTEXT 
EMMA NITZBERG* 
Abstract: In the Admiralty proceeding Frescati Shipping Co. v. Citgo Asphalt 
Refining Co., an oil tanker within its final approach of its destination on the 
Delaware River struck an abandoned ship anchor. The anchor punctured the 
hull of the ship, allowing 263,000 gallons of crude oil to spill from it. In re-
viewing the trial court’s decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit employed the clearly erroneous standard of review. Using this highly def-
erential standard, the Third Circuit held that the trial court had failed to find 
facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately, requirements of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1). In the highly specialized context of 
Admiralty law, uniformity and consistency are especially necessary. By em-
ploying the clearly erroneous standard of review in the Admiralty context, the 
Third Circuit adequately served the aim of maintaining uniformity of results 
within a niche area of law. 
INTRODUCTION 
No two oil spills are ever exactly the same.1 The type of oil, location, 
and amount of oil spilled are just a few general components that contribute 
to the success or failure of a clean-up process.2 Generally, there are four 
main types of oil spill clean-up techniques: leave the oil alone so that it nat-
urally breaks down; contain the spill with booms and collect it from the wa-
ter’s surface using skimmer equipment; use dispersants to break up the oil 
and speed up the natural biodegradation process; or introduce biological 
agents to the spill to hasten biodegradation.3 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–2016. 
 1 See How Do You Clean Up an Oil Spill?, U. OF DEL. SEA GRANT PROGRAM, http://www.
ceoe.udel.edu/oilspill/cleanup.html [http://perma.cc/6S5Y-4NCF]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. When spilled, different types of oil will have various effects on aquatic ecosystems. See 
Andrea Thompson, FAQ: The Science and History of Oil Spills, LIVESCIENCE (Apr. 23, 2010, 
6:52 AM), http://www.livescience.com/9885-faq-science-history-oil-spills.html [http://perma.cc/
4DHS-HMGB]. Lighter oils, like gasoline and diesel fuel, can be highly toxic to living organisms and 
fatal when an animal breathes in fumes or absorbs the oil through their skin. Id. Heavy crude oil, alt-
hough less toxic than gasoline, coats the furs and skins of marine wildlife, smothering them to death. 
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From 1970 until 2009, a reported 1.7 billion gallons of oil have been 
spilled from tankers into waters around the world, according to the Interna-
tional Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited.4 In the thirty-one years 
between 1972 and 2004, the Delaware Bay alone has endured more than 13 
million gallons of oil spills.5 
One evening in November 2004, the Athos I tanker made its way up 
the Delaware River, nearing the end of a 1900-mile journey from Venezue-
la.6 The Athos I had been sub-chartered from a pool of tankers by a set of 
Citgo Oil affiliates (“CARCO”), and was delivering a shipment of crude 
oil.7 As it made its final approach towards Citgo Oil’s New Jersey Asphalt 
Refinery, the vessel had an allision with an abandoned ship anchor just 900 
feet from the pier.8 Upon contact, the Athos I’s load of crude oil spilled into 
the Delaware River through two punctures in the ship’s hull.9 
At the time of the spill, the Athos I had been contracted by CARCO to 
carry oil from Venezuela.10 Contracts in Admiralty law are called charter 
parties.11 Prior to the spill in 2001, the Athos I had been enlisted in a tanker 
pool pursuant to a time charter party between Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd. 
(“Frescati”) and Star Tankers, Inc. (“Star Tankers”).12 CARCO then sub-
chartered the Athos I from Star Tankers to transport a shipment of heavy 
                                                                                                                           
Id. When the feathers of seabirds or fur of marine mammals get covered in heavy crude oil, the animals 
are unable to maintain their normal body temperatures, causing death by hypothermia. Id. Because oil 
floats, the animals most often harmed in such a disaster are sea otters and sea birds that are found at the 
sea’s surface. How Oil Harms Animals and Plants in Marine Environments, OFFICE OF RESPONSE & 
RESTORATION, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/oil-
and-chemical-spills/oil-spills/how-oil-harms-animals-and-plants.html [http://perma.cc/UDE2-LV9K]. 
 4 Thompson, supra note 3. 
 5 The Athos I Oil Spill on the Delaware River, U. OF DEL. SEA GRANT PROGRAM, http://
www.ceoe.udel.edu/oilspill/index.html [http://perma.cc/BY35-7HMQ] (listing individual spills in 
the Delaware River and Bay). 
 6 Frescati Shipping Co. v. Citgo Asphalt Refining Co., 718 F.3d 184, 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 7 Id. at 190. 
 8 Id. at 192. An allision is defined as “the running of one ship upon another ship that is station-
ary—distinguished from collision.” John Konrad, Allision—Nautical Word of the Day, GCAPTAIN 
(Nov. 8, 2007), http://gcaptain.com/maritime-word-of-the-day-allision/#.Vhf2UrRViko [http://perma.
cc/CZH5-XVNM]. 
 9 Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d at 189. 
 10 Id. at 190. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 191. In reviewing the Admiralty contract between the parties, the Court provided: 
“Under a time charter, the owner [Frescati] remains responsible for the navigation and 
operation of the vessel and the charterer [Star Tankers] assumes responsibility for ar-
ranging for the employment of the vessel, providing fuel and paying for certain cargo-
related expenses.” The time charter party gave Star Tankers, an intermediary or “mid-
dleman,” the right to sub-charter the Athos I although Frescati remained responsible for 
keeping the vessel staffed and serviceable. 
Id. (quoting TERENCE COGHLIN ET AL., TIME CHARTERS ¶ 1.59 (2008)). 
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crude oil from Venezuela to its asphalt refinery in Paulsboro, New Jersey.13 
The charter party drawn between Star Tankers and CARCO was a voyage 
charter party.14 This voyage charter party was based on a standard industry 
form, which contained what is known as a “safe port” and “safe berth” war-
ranty (“safe berth warranty”).15 The safe berth warranty provided that the 
Athos I would “proceed as ordered to Loading Port[s] named . . . or so near 
thereunto as she may safely get . . . .”16 Once loaded, she would go as or-
dered directly to the discharging port, or so near as she may safely get.17 
The safe berth warranty further provided that the Athos I would load and 
discharge at any place or wharf that is designated and procured by CARCO, 
provided she can do so safely afloat.18 
In the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the United States govern-
ment passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”) to incentivize “respon-
sible parties” to quickly facilitate the clean-up process from oil spills.19 
OPA enables the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to respond to oil 
spills swiftly by drawing on funds from a trust financed by a tax on oil, ex-
clusively available to clean up oil spills.20 By setting liability limits on the 
amount a party can recoup, OPA incentivizes private parties to swiftly con-
duct clean-up of a spill and thus limit their financial exposure and damage 
to the environment.21 Prior to the enactment of OPA, responses to oil spill 
and liability lacked definitive language explaining who was responsible to 
report and respond to a spill, which party was in charge of clean-up and 
containment, and the finite circumstances under which a party could avoid 
liability or limit it, among other specifications.22 
To comply with OPA, Frescati quickly initiated a clean-up response, 
with the intention of limiting their liability and receiving reimbursements 
from the U.S. government.23 Looking to reassign liability for the debacle, in 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Id. at 190. 
 14 Id. at 191. “Unlike a time charter party in which a ‘vessel’s employment is put under the 
orders of . . . charterers’ for a period of time, under a voyage charter party the ship is hired ‘to 
perform one or more designated voyages in return for the payment of freight.’” Id. (quoting JUL-
IAN COOKE ET AL., VOYAGE CHARTERS ¶ 1.1 (2007)). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2012); Frescati Shipping Co., 718 
F.3d at 193. “OPA was born of two imperfect parents—the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA) and the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).” David H. Sump, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A 
Glance in the Rearview Mirror, 85 TUL. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2011). 
 20 Summary of the Oil Pollution Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/summary-oil-pollution-act [http://perma.cc/E78Y-H7WN]. 
 21 Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d at 193. 
 22 See Sump, supra note 19, at 1102–03. 
 23 See Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d at 193. 
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two consolidated actions, Frescati filed suit against CARCO in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging a 
breach of contract for CARCO’s breach of a safe berth warranty, negli-
gence, and negligent misrepresentation.24 To recoup the costs not reimbursed 
by the U.S. government, Frescati filed contract and tort claims against CAR-
CO.25 The government also sought reimbursement from CARCO to Fres-
cati’s contractual claim pursuant to a limited settlement agreement.26 After a 
forty-one day bench trial, the District Court found that CARCO was not 
liable for the accident under any of the three claims.27 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1), “[I]n an action 
tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find 
the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.”28 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit employed de novo review to 
assess the District Court’s conclusions of law regarding the charter party 
and the legal question of the nature and extent of the duty of due care owed 
by CARCO.29 The Third Circuit found that the District Court violated 
FRCP 52(a) when the District Court judge elected “to set forth in a narrative 
fashion his finding of facts and conclusions of law.”30 In Federalist Paper 
No. 80, Alexander Hamilton wrote of Admiralty Laws: “They so generally 
depend on the law of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreign-
ers, that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the public 
peace.”31 This Comment argues that the Third Circuit appropriately em-
ployed FRCP 52(a) and the clearly erroneous standard of review in this 
case, thus maintaining the federal interests of uniformity and consistency in 
Admiralty proceedings so as to provide an undeviating standard across all 
jurisdictions.32 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Athos I was a single-hulled oil tanker owned by Frescati.33 At the 
time of the accident, the Athos I was chartered by Star Tankers (who was 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See id. at 190. 
 25 Id. at 189. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1). 
 29 Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d at 196. 
 30 Id. at 197. 
 31 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894); see also 
Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original Understandings and the Private Law Origins of the Federal Admi-
ralty Jurisdiction: A Reply to Professor Castro, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 361, 373 (1999). 
 32 See infra notes 100–143 and accompanying text. 
 33 Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d at 190. 
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not a party in this action).34 To prepare for arrival in New Jersey, the master 
of the Athos I was given a copy of CARCO’s port manual, which stated that 
the allowable maximum draft at the port was thirty-eight feet, but that this 
number was subject to change and should be verified before a vessel’s arri-
val.35 Four days prior to Athos I’s arrival, the maximum draft was reduced 
to thirty-six feet, unbeknownst to its master and crew.36 At the original trial, 
there were no findings on the record regarding the Athos I’s draft at the time 
of the accident.37 
On November 26, 2004, the Athos I neared its final destination at 
CARCO’s asphalt refinery in Paulsboro, New Jersey.38 CARCO’s asphalt 
refinery is located on a jetty on the New Jersey side of the Delaware Riv-
er.39 Federal Anchorage Number Nine “separates the River channel from 
CARCO’s port waters.”40 Following customary industry procedure for 
docking, the Athos I made a “starboard (right) 180-degree turn into the An-
chorage” and then was “pushed sideways by tugs (i.e. parallel parked) into 
CARCO’s pier.”41 At around 9:02 PM, while this process was underway, the 
Athos I “suddenly listed to the port (left) side, and oil became visible in the 
water.”42 An abandoned anchor had punctured the Athos I, creating two 
holes that spilled 263,000 gallons of crude oil into the Delaware River.43 
When the Athos I made contact with the anchor, it was 900 feet from CAR-
CO’s berth, “approximately half way through the Anchorage.”44 The tide 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 191–92. A draft is defined as: 
The depth of the vessel below the waterline measured vertically to the lowest part of 
the hull, propellers, or other reference point. When measured to the lowest project-
ing portion of the vessel, it is called the “draft, extreme”; when measured at the bow, 
it is called “draft, forward”; and when measured at the stern, the “draft, aft”; the av-
erage of the draft, forward, and the draft, aft is the “draft, mean,” and the mean draft 
when in full load condition is the “draft load.” 




 36 Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d at 192. 
 37 Id. at 204. 
 38 Id. at 192. 
 39 Id. “Jetty” is defined as “a long structure that is built out into water and used as a place to 
get on, get off, or tie up a boat.” Jetty, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/jetty [http://perma.cc/DK4B-VAEK]. 
 40 Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d at 192. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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had reached its lowest point fifty minutes prior to the accident, and thus was 
still relatively low.45 
The District Court did not make a finding of fact as to the exact posi-
tion of the anchor at the time of contact, nor did it make a “finding as to the 
depth of the Anchorage where the anchor lay.”46 Nonetheless, the District 
Court found expert testimony providing that the anchor was “lying horizon-
tal at the time of the accident with a height of 41 inches above the bottom of 
the River” to be persuasive.47 The District Court also did not make any find-
ing as to the draft of the Athos I, but “assumed for purposes of analysis” that 
Frescati’s representation—thirty-six feet, seven inches—was correct.48 Fur-
ther, the District Court did not resolve the issue of depth or position of the 
anchor, although again found “persuasive evidence that the anchor was ly-
ing down at the time of the accident.”49 On appeal, the Third Circuit found a 
FRCP 52 violation due to the District Court’s failure to find specific facts.50 
Frescati spent roughly $180 million in clean-up costs for oil deposited 
in the Delaware River and damages to the Athos I.51 Because of the cap on 
recoupable funds from OPA, Frescati was only able to obtain $88 million in 
reimbursement from the U.S. government and was, thus, still responsible 
for paying $45,474,000 in clean-up costs.52 As a result, the government 
stepped into Frescati’s position as a statutory subrogee, seeking damages 
from the terminal owner, CARCO, for the value of reimbursement costs.53 
In January 2005, Frescati filed a “Complaint for Exoneration From or 
Limitation of Liability pursuant to the Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability 
Act.”54 In their complaint, Frescati sought a declaration that it was not liable 
for any losses from the accident, “or in the alternative, a limit on liability to 
the value of the Athos I and its pending freight.”55 CARCO asserted claims 
in the action against Frescati, seeking recovery for its lost oil in the amount 
of $259,217.56 Frescati then filed a counterclaim against CARCO for the 
costs that Fresceti had incurred beyond those that had been reimbursed by 
the government under OPA.57 In 2008, the U.S. government, as statutory 
subrogee, filed another suit against CARCO seeking $88 million in com-
                                                                                                                           
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 193. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 197. 
 51 Id. at 189. 
 52 Id. at 193. 
 53 Id. at 189. 
 54 Id. at 195. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
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pensation.58 In a partial settlement agreement, the U.S. government waived 
its negligence claims against CARCO in exchange for CARCO’s agreement 
to refrain from pursuing its negligence claims against the government.59 
The government then moved for partial summary judgment as it believed 
CARCO was advancing on its negligence claim, which was denied.60 The 
two actions were consolidated and were tried during a forty-one day bench 
trial.61 
The District Court found that CARCO was not responsible under a 
contract or tort theory for any of the losses from the accident.62 The District 
Court found that Frescati lacked standing because they were not a “third 
party beneficiary to the voyage charter party between CARCO and Star 
Tankers,” and that CARCO had not breached the safe berth warranties.63 
The District Court further ruled that CARCO “was not negligent in failing 
to search for or detect the abandoned anchor that lay in the Anchorage” as it 
was “outside the approach to CARCO’s berth” and “thus fell beyond its 
obligation to provide a safe entry.”64 The District Court finally held that 
there was no negligent misrepresentation by CARCO in failing to alert the 
Athos I that “the maximum draft had been reduced from 38 feet to 36 
feet.”65 Instead, the District Court decided that “the anchor-dropper,” rather 
than CARCO, was at fault and thus rejected all claims.66 
The Third Circuit ultimately issued four holdings.67 In its endeavor to 
provide a more thorough analysis, the Third Circuit found that the District 
Court had violated FRCP 52 due to a clear lack of factual findings.68 Moreo-
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. “Subrogation” means assuming the legal rights of a person for whom expenses or a debt 
has been paid. Typically, subrogation occurs when an insurance company that pays its insured 
client for injuries and losses then sues the party that the injured person contends caused the dam-
ages to him/her. Subrogation, LAW.COM, http://dictionary.law.com/default.aspx?selected=2044 
[https://perma.cc/VRC6-7PKP]. A “subrogee” is the person or entity that assumes the legal right 
to attempt to collect a claim of another (subrogor) in return for paying the other’s expenses or 
debts which the other claims against a third party. Subrogee, THE FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX, 
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/subrogee [https://perma.cc/RZF2-94BR]. 
 59 Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d at 195. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 196. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 214–15. The Court held: (1) as the tanker owner, Frescati was a third party beneficiary 
of the safe berth warranty; (2) whether the safe berth warranty had been breached was dependent 
upon whether the port was safe based on agreed upon dimensions of the draft; (3) the Athos I had 
been within its final approach to CARCO’s terminal and thus CARCO had a duty to exercise reason-
able diligence in providing a safe approach; and (4) Frescati could not recover based on a claim for 
negligent misrepresentation. Id. 
 68 Id. at 197. 
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ver, the Third Circuit found that the District Court committed error by drawing 
conclusions of law given the obvious absence of critical factual findings.69 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 52(a)(1) states: “[I]n an action 
tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find 
the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.”70 From 
FRCP 52 springs the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review.71 In 
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., the United States Supreme Court defined 
the clearly erroneous standard when officials of Gypsum Co. were indicted 
for violations of the Sherman Act.72 The Supreme Court found testimony 
from the trial court was in conflict with “contemporaneous documents” re-
garding a specific finding, and therefore the trial court’s findings were 
clearly erroneous.73 A finding is clearly erroneous “when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with 
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”74  
In Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., FRCP 52(a) was further 
clarified when Lakeland Highlands Canning Company joined with others to 
enforce the Grower’s Cost Guarantee Act.75 When corporations of Florida 
and other states failed to comply with a state statute, the Commissioner of 
Agriculture, Nathan Mayo, attempted to cancel their licenses as citrus fruit 
dealers.76 Defendant Mayo appealed a judgment granting a temporary in-
junction on the cancellation of the licenses.77 On appeal, the Supreme Court 
held that an appellant is entitled “to have explicit findings of fact upon 
which the conclusion of the court was based.”78 Furthermore, “[s]uch find-
ings are obviously necessary to the intelligent and orderly presentation and 
proper disposition of an appeal.”79 
FRCP 52 resurfaced in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
when the U.S. Circuit Court for the Second Circuit heard a case in which 
defendants were charged with “monopolizing interstate and foreign com-
merce.”80 Judge Learned Hand remarked that defining “clearly erroneous” 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See id. 
 70 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1). 
 71 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
 72 Id. at 366–67, 371–72. 
 73 Id. at 396. 
 74 Id. at 395. 
 75 309 U.S. 310, 311–13 (1940). 
 76 Id. at 311–12. 
 77 Id. at 312. 
 78 Id. at 317. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See 148 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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was difficult, and all that could be said about the standard is that an appel-
late court will reverse a judge’s findings only very reluctantly, suggesting a 
high degree of deference to the trial court.81 
In 1985, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Anderson v. 
City of Bessemer City, in which an applicant alleged sex discrimination 
against the City of Bessemer when a job position was given to a male appli-
cant in her stead.82 Justice Byron White opined for the court that the Second 
Circuit had “misapprehended and misapplied the clearly erroneous stand-
ard” in overturning three of the District Court’s findings.83 The Supreme 
Court provided limits to the application of clearly erroneous, stating: “The 
reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it un-
dertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court . . . . [A]ppellate courts 
must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual is-
sues de novo.”84 
 In 1980, the U.S. Circuit Court for the Third Circuit in H. Prang 
Trucking Co. v. Local Union 469 relied on Wright and Miller’s Federal 
Practice & Procedure as authority to require trial courts to follow FRCP 52 
on a mandatory basis.85 In H. Prang Trucking Co., an employer appealed 
from an order and judgment denying motions for preliminary and perma-
nent injunctions.86 The Third Circuit cited as circuit precedent O’Neill v. 
United States, asserting that FRCP 52(a) “is not satisfied ‘by the statement 
of the ultimate fact without the subordinate factual foundations for it which 
also must be the subject of specific findings.’”87 The Third Circuit further 
dictated that subordinate findings “may not be left unarticulated . . . . 
[T]herefore, it is necessary that the trial court specify these subordinate 
facts upon which the ultimate factual conclusion must rest.”88 An appeals 
court will “vacate the judgment and remand the case for findings if the trial 
court has failed to make findings when they are required or if the findings it 
has made are not sufficient for a clear understanding of the basis of the de-
cision.”89 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. at 433. 
 82 See 470 U.S. 564, 567 (1985). 
 83 Id. at 566. 
 84 Id. at 573 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123, (1969)). 
 85 H. Prang Trucking Co. v. Local Union 469, 613 F.2d 1235, 1238 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing 9 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR T. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2574 
(1971)). 
 86 Id. at 1236. 
 87 Id. at 1238 (citing O’Neill v. United States, 411 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1969)). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
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In 1990, the Third Circuit expanded their FRCP 52 jurisprudence in 
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of Education.90 In Bradley, a high school 
teacher filed a motion for preliminary injunction to stop a school from elim-
inating a teaching methodology she favored, and from retaliating against 
her for using that method.91 When the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania denied her motion, the teacher appealed.92 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the District Court 
failed to make required findings of fact and conclusions of law upon their 
denial, requiring remand where the Third Circuit was unable to determine 
why the District Court had rejected the preliminary injunction on the teach-
er’s claim for banning the teaching method.93 The Third Circuit, applying 
the Mayo standard, held that an FRCP 52 violation is marked by inadequate 
findings that are “obviously necessary to the intelligent and orderly presen-
tation and proper disposition of an appeal.”94 
FRCP 52 does have its limits, as set forth in Hazeltine Corp. v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., which clarified that the rule does not mandate a literal adher-
ence, but that an appellate court may remand a case for further findings if 
the trial court failed to make findings that are required.95 The Third Circuit 
stated: “The failure of the trial judge to comply literally with the provisions 
of Rule 52(a) . . . is not always a ground for reversal and remand with in-
structions to make specific findings as required by the Rule.”96 The rule 
requires that in an action tried on the facts without a jury, the court must 
find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately, and that 
an appellate court shall uphold the lower court's findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous.97 
A final significant Rule 52(a) decision was McAllister v. United States, 
in which the Supreme Court decided a case brought by an assistant engineer 
under the Suits in Admiralty Act because he contracted polio in poor condi-
                                                                                                                           
 90 See 910 F.2d 1172, 1174 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 1178. 
 94 Id. (quoting Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 317 (1940)). 
 95 131 F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir. 1942) (“If . . . the opinion of the trial judge afforded a ‘clear un-
derstanding of the basis of the decision below’ and resolved the major factual disputes, the mere 
formal requirement of separation of findings of fact and conclusions of law has been held not 
sufficient to necessitate a reversal.”); see U.S Gypsum Co. 333 U.S. at 542; see also Edward H. 
Cooper, Civil Rule 50(A): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 645–46 (1988) (arguing that the clearly erroneous standard of review 
has no intrinsic meaning, and is successful because it is “elastic, capacious, malleable, and above 
all variable”). 
 96 Hazeltine Corp., 131 F.2d at 37. 
 97 See Maureen McGirr, Note, Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Manufacturing Co.: De Novo Re-
view and the Federal Circuit’s Application of the Clearly Erroneous Standard, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 
963, 963 (1987). 
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tions while on board a vessel.98 McAllister established that FRCP 52(a)’s 
application of a clearly erroneous standard was the proper standard of re-
view for findings of fact in an Admiralty proceeding.99 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Frescati Shipping Co. v. Citgo Asphalt Refining Co., the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit ultimately issued four holdings.100 First, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s deci-
sion that Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd. (“Frescati”) was not a third party bene-
ficiary of the “safe port” and “safe berth” warranty (“safe berth warranty”) 
within the charter party was overturned.101 Although not a named benefi-
ciary within the charter party between Star Tankers Inc. (“Star Tankers”) 
and a set of Citgo Oil affiliates (“CARCO”), the Court reasoned that the 
Athos I benefited from the warranty.102 Second, the Court held that the Ath-
os I was within its “final approach” when it struck the submerged anchor.103 
This determination was integral in assessing CARCO’s geographic sphere 
of responsibility necessary in calculating its assumption of duty.104 Third, 
the Court held that although assessing the standard of care required for a 
reasonable wharfinger is a matter of law, “factual findings predominate” in 
a negligence analysis.105 In its attempt to review the factual findings for 
clear error, the Court again bluntly noted that “there were no findings” to be 
assessed.106 The Court’s final holding stated that Frescati’s attempt to re-
cover by negligent misrepresentation “fails . . . as a matter of law.”107 
Within the third holding, the Third Circuit employed FRCP 52(a)’s 
clearly erroneous standard to the District Court’s findings on the issue of 
breach of the safe berth warranty.108 The Court in Frescati Shipping Co. 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See 348 U.S. 19, 19–20 (1954). 
 99 Id. at 20. 
 100 718 F.3d 184, 215 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 101 Id. at 200. 
 102 Id. at 197–98 (holding that Frescati, as the owner of the Athos I, was thus a third-party 
beneficiary). 
 103 Id. at 211. 
 104 See id. (establishing that the Athos I was within its final approach when the allision oc-
curred, and also establishing that CARCO had a duty to exercise reasonable diligence in providing 
the Athos I with a safe approach). 
 105 Id. “Wharfinger” is defined as “The owner or occupier of a wharf . . . .” Wharfinger, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2010). 
 106 Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d at 211. 
 107 Id. at 214. 
 108 See id. at 197. The District Court failed to make findings of fact on crucial details, such as 
the draft of the Athos I. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit commented: 
Instead, it concluded “that the port and berth were generally safe” due to “the vol-
ume of commercial traffic that passed without incident,” not withstanding that it was 
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applied FRCP 52(a) as it had in H. Prang Trucking Co. v. Locan Union 469, 
asserting that it is not satisfied “by the statement of the ultimate fact without 
the subordinate factual foundations for it which also must be the subject of 
specific findings.”109 In its analysis, the Court in Frescati Shipping Co. not-
ed that the District Court did not make any finding “as to the draft of the 
Athos I,” but instead assumed that it was drawing 36 feet, 7 inches, as indi-
cated by Frescati at the time of the accident.110 Furthermore, the Court high-
lighted that the District Court did not definitively resolve the question of the 
anchor’s depth or its position, despite “‘persuasive evidence’ that the anchor 
was lying down at the time of the accident.”111 It was further stipulated that 
in order to resolve the issue of the violation of the safe berth warranty, it 
was crucial to determine whether the anchor “rendered CARCO’s port un-
safe for the Athos I’s agreed-upon dimensions and draft.”112 The allision 
with the anchor was not an automatic indication of a breached safe berth 
warranty; therefore, specific factual findings were necessary to resolve the 
issue.113 The Court found that an FRCP 52(a) violation had indeed oc-
curred, in that the District Court’s inadequate findings rendered a clear un-
derstanding of the basis of the decision impossible.114 Ultimately, the Court 
found that to reach the heart of the issue at trial—whether the safe berth 
warranty had been breached—more detailed factual findings were neces-
sary.115 The District Court’s opinion that the port and berth were “generally 
safe” due to the volume of commercial traffic that had passed without inci-
dent, or that similar ships had successfully berthed at the port, fell far below 
the standard set forth in FRCP 52, and thus needed to be corrected on re-
mand.116 
In an absence of clear distinction between what is clearly erroneous and 
what is not, legal scholars have rightly approached FRCP 52(a) with cau-
tion.117 The actual definition of the phrase “clearly erroneous” and the precise 
                                                                                                                           
impossible to know how many ships had passed over the anchor. That similar ships 
had successfully berthed at the port is irrelevant to whether the warranty was actual-
ly breached in this case . . . . Instead, the Court should have evaluated whether the 
port was safe based on the facts particular to the Athos I and its arrival. 
Id. at 203–04 (citations omitted).  
 109 Id. at 196; see H. Prang Trucking Co. v. Local Union 469, 613 F.2d 1235, 1238 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
 110 Frescati Shipping Co., 718 F.3d at 193. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 203. 
 113 See id. 
 114 Id. at 197. 
 115 Id. at 203–04. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id. at 196. 
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standard of review are not universally clear.118 Judge Learned Hand aptly 
stated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America: “It is idle to try to define 
the meaning of the phrase, ‘clearly erroneous’ . . . .”119 The Supreme Court 
even acknowledged its ambiguity in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, when 
Justice Byron White opined that “the meaning of the phrase ‘clearly errone-
ous’ is not immediately apparent . . . .”120 To add murkiness to the review 
standard, clearly erroneous review is meant to apply only to a trial court’s 
findings of fact, but not to its conclusions of law.121 Therefore a distinction 
between fact and law must be drawn despite the two so often being so inter-
twined, allowing an appellate court even broader discretion in its review of a 
lower court.122 With its present ambiguities, an appellate court could likely 
evade the constraints of the standard, particularly when a trial court lacks a 
specialized understanding to distinguish between facts and law.123 
In review of a lower court’s decision in the absence of a jury, the clear-
ly erroneous standard has been employed “in justification of widely diver-
gent appellate decisions, ranging from complete adherence to the trial 
court’s findings of fact to complete disregard of these findings, depending 
upon the qualitative difference between witness testimony and documentary 
evidence.”124 As one scholar writes, “Although rule 52(a) seems clear on its 
face and its drafters intended it to apply in all cases, its application in cases 
where the evidence is documentary or undisputed has been anything but 
uniform.”125 This scholar even goes as far as to assert that evasion of the 
rule by circuit courts can be attributable to mere “judicial dissatisfaction” 
                                                                                                                           
 118 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 119 Id.; see Cooper, supra note 95, at 645 (arguing that the clearly erroneous standard of re-
view has no intrinsic meaning, and is successful because it is “elastic, capacious, malleable, and 
above all variable”). 
 120 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); see Cooper, supra note 95, at 645. 
 121 See McGirr, supra note 97, at 964. 
 122 See id.; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984) 
(“Rule 52(a) does not inhibit an appellate court’s power to correct errors of law, including those 
that may infect a so-called mixed findings of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on 
a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law.”); Fowler v. LAC Minerals (USA), LLC, 694 
F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2012) (reviewing the interpretation of a contract de novo as a mixed case 
of law and fact); Joseph v. Daily News Pub. Co., 57 V.I. 566, 582–83 (2012) (citing Bose in its 
statement that in certain instances, appellate courts are forced into the position of balancing ‘clear-
ly erroneous’ with the constitutional requirement that the reviewing court must make an independ-
ent examination of the whole record in a defamation suit). 
 123 See McGirr, supra note 97, at 964. 
 124 Susan R. Petito, Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate 
Fact Review: Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Erroneous?, 52 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 68, 68–69 (1977). 
 125 See id. at 90. 
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with restriction of appellate court power to review “all the factors leading to 
a lower court decision.”126 
Despite an evidently malleable application of clearly erroneous standard 
of review, the Third Circuit appropriately applied FRCP 52(a) in reviewing 
the District Court’s lack of factual findings in Frescati Shipping Co.127 FRCP 
52 was not applicable in Admiralty law until McCallister was decided in 
1954.128 Courts, however, including the Supreme Court, have held than an 
appeal in Admiralty from a District Court, a Circuit Court, or a Circuit Court 
of Appeals operates to set up a trial de novo at the appeal level (notably con-
trasted to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bessemer, stating that an appellate 
court is over-stepping its duties if it decides factual issues de novo).129 By the 
early 1800’s, however, appeals in Admiralty were already distinguished from 
those of other civil trials.130 “An appeal . . . in [A]dmiralty, is rather in nature 
of a new trial, in which the court does not enter into the mere consideration of 
the propriety of the decision of the judge below . . . but affords an opportunity 
to the appellant to present his case with the best possible aspect that new alle-
gations, or new evidence can afford it.”131 As far back as 1809, Chief Justice 
John Marshall asserted that appealed decisions in Admiralty suspend a sen-
tence altogether and “is not res adjudicata until the final sentence of the ap-
pellate court is pronounced . . . . The cause in the appellate court is to be 
heard de novo as if no decree had been passed.”132 
As a distinctive area of law, Admiralty jurisprudence has been shaped 
by the uniformity that flows from original federal jurisdiction, established 
during the drafting of Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 that marked a legislative lineage of Admiralty jurisdiction 
grants throughout congressional history.133 The very foundation of original 
federal Admiralty jurisdiction was to promote a fundamental interest in con-
sistency across jurisdictions to ensure “uniform rules of conduct.”134 More-
                                                                                                                           
 126 See id. 
 127 See id. 
 128 See McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 19–20 (1954). 
 129 See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (opining that the appel-
late court oversteps its bounds if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court); Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (echoing the Bessemer holding 
that an appellate court’s role is not to decide factual issues de novo); Rodney M. Nash, Nature and 
Extent of Review Upon Appeal of Causes in Admiralty, 103 AM. L. REP. 775, 778 (1936) (explain-
ing that many courts have viewed appeals in Admiralty from district courts as vacating the lower 
court’s decree, to ensure that a trial is thoroughly de novo). 
 130 See Nash, supra note 129, at 778. 
 131 Id. (quoting Rose v. Himely, 20 F. Cas. 1178 (C.C.D. S.C. 1805). 
 132 Id. (citing Saratoga v. 438 Bales of Cotton, 21 F. Cas. 482 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (italics add-
ed). 
 133 See Frank R. Kennedy, Jurisdictional Problems Between Admiralty and Bankruptcy Courts, 
59 TUL. L. REV. 1182, 1182 (1985). 
 134 See Christine M.G. Davis et al., 11 N.Y. JUR.2D BOATS Ships and Shipping § 9 (2015). 
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over, the restricted instances in which creating federal common law is per-
mitted includes proceedings in Admiralty because there exists a unique fed-
eral interest in providing “rules of law for the business of shipping, to facili-
tate maritime commerce”—and, most importantly in Frescati Shipping 
Co.— “to apply uniform remedies for persons traveling or working on nav-
igable waters in connection with these activities.”135 The Supplemental 
Rules For Admiralty Or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions pro-
vides that the FRCP applies in maritime and Admiralty proceedings “except 
to the extent that they are inconsistent with these Supplemental Rules.”136  
In a general civil context, the potential for abuse of a clearly erroneous 
review has rightly been raised as a concern.137 This concern, however, does 
not plague Admiralty jurisprudence to the same extent.138 Due to its recog-
nition as a specialized area of the law deserving of strong protections and 
promotions of uniformity, using a clearly erroneous review standard pursu-
ant to FRCP 52 in Admiralty law poses less of a risk of variation than in 
broader legal contexts, and instead promotes consistency in case out-
comes.139 Whether an appellate court decides to find the facts after the low-
er court fails to (in a sense a de novo trial), or remands a case for clearer 
findings, the result is a more thorough exposure of facts in an Admiralty 
proceeding.140 FRCP 52’s requirement that facts should be found specially 
and law found separately, coupled with the highly deferential standard of 
review on appeal, ensured that more explicit factual findings would emerge 
in Frescati Shipping Co.141  
In Frescati Shipping Co., the Third Circuit solidified federal Admiralty 
law uniformity and united both civil and maritime aims in its application of 
Rule 52.142 Despite the potential for an over-broad appellate review in typi-
cal civil matters, FRCP 52 was correctly applied in an instance that was in 
essence clearly an error and, therefore, harmoniously exists to serve the 
Admiralty interest of uniformity.143 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See Lee A. Handford, Do Not Fear to Tread on Solid Ground: The Role of the Supreme 
Court in Furthering Uniformity in Admiralty Law, 10 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 235, 236 (1998). 
 136 FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. A(2). 
 137 See Petito, supra note 124, at 90. 
 138 See supra notes 133–137, infra notes 139–143 and accompanying text (explaining that 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit used the stand-
ard of findings set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) to serve a 
unifying purpose in an Admiralty context. Rule 52 has surfaced in Admiralty 
proceedings in other jurisdictions; however, Frescati Shipping Co. v. Citgo 
Asphalt Refining Co. exemplifies the Third Circuit’s correct application of the 
Rule in this context. The Rule 52 violation resulting in clearly erroneous ap-
pellate review in Frescati Shipping Co. served to create further consensus and 
clarity in Admiralty law and was, thus, correctly applied. 
